lib: [aes-cbc] fix zero-length message handling in decrypt direction

F-INTEL-IPSEC-MB-AES-CBC-LEN0-OOB-001

Public snapshot: 26 Sep 2026. Status, releases and attribution belong to each source below; none is inferred from another record.

Recorded evidence

—score not recorded

intel/intel-ipsec-mbReported fixintel/intel-ipsec-mb

lib: [aes-cbc] fix zero-length message handling in decrypt direction

fixed publicly

details

Finding IDs: F-INTEL-IPSEC-MB-AES-CBC-LEN0-OOB-001
Status: fixed publicly
Reported via: security contact
Note: public fix commit 78e272a08a7c landed on 2026-04-11 and shipped in intel-ipsec-mb v2.0.2, tagged on 2026-04-21. the AES-CBC decrypt path now checks for zero-length messages before loading the IV/message buffers, avoiding the no-check API out-of-bounds read class.

F-INTEL-IPSEC-MB-AES-CBC-LEN0-OOB-001: Memory safety. Zero-length AES-CBC input reaches out-of-bounds processing. Reviewed 24 Sep 2026. Mechanism assessed by 1seal.

Mechanism source for F-INTEL-IPSEC-MB-AES-CBC-LEN0-OOB-001

Security area (1seal assessment): Memory safety. The AES-CBC decrypt routine returns before accessing message data when the input length is zero. Reviewed 21 Sep 2026.

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