1sealsemantic last-mile verification

Research / Finding

normalize trailing-dot DNS names before name-constraint matching

F-BC-NC-TRAILINGDOT-001

Public snapshot: 26 Sep 2026. Status, releases and attribution belong to each source below; none is inferred from another record.

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Recorded evidence

—score not recorded
bcgit/bc-javaReported fixbcgit/bc-java

normalize trailing-dot DNS names before name-constraint matching

Fixed in: Java 1.85 and C# 2.7.0

fixed publicly
details
Finding IDs
F-BC-NC-TRAILINGDOT-001
Status
fixed publicly
Fixed in
Java 1.85 and C# 2.7.0
Reported via
security contact
Note
A terminal DNS root-label dot could make an otherwise matching certificate DNS name miss an excluded name constraint. The Java change of 13 May 2026 normalizes one trailing dot on both the tested DNS name and constraint before exact and subtree comparison. Java 1.85 contains this check; C# 2.7.0 applies corresponding normalization in NameConstraintDns. This replaces the previous main-only, release-unconfirmed status. The record covers the original DNS comparison issue, not every email or URI normalization change in the same release; no CVE is borrowed from an adjacent fix. This is source/version confirmation, not a new certificate-chain retest.

F-BC-NC-TRAILINGDOT-001: Verification failures. Trailing-dot DNS normalization is inconsistent with name-constraint enforcement. Reviewed 26 Sep 2026. Mechanism assessed by 1seal.

Mechanism source for F-BC-NC-TRAILINGDOT-001

Security area (1seal assessment): Identity. DNS name-constraint comparison normalizes the root-label trailing dot before matching certificate identities. Reviewed 26 Sep 2026.

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