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Technical write-up

AWS-LC: CommonName constraint bypasses

1SEAL-2026-002 · Original publication: 2026-03-19

Original dated analysis; subsequent corrections are marked.

Update, 2026-10-10: corrected the scope of affected systems. The error needs both a certificate without a dNSName in its SAN and name verification that falls back to the CN (per the AWS advisory). Earlier wording described the affected environments more broadly and named SPIFFE/SPIRE, Kubernetes mTLS, service mesh, IoT and enterprise PKI as affected; the use of those does not show that a deployment is affected. Standard SPIFFE X509-SVID validation relies on a URI SAN and does not use the CN, so the SPIFFE name alone is evidence of neither exposure nor immunity: an integration that also performs CN-based hostname checks on a certificate with no DNS SAN can still be affected.

summary

two linked certificate validation vulnerabilities in aws-lc, Amazon's fork of BoringSSL, allow certificates to bypass RFC 5280 Name Constraints when the certificate has no dNSName in its subjectAlternativeName (SAN) and name verification falls back to the commonName (CN).

the first vulnerability allows a wildcard CN (e.g., *.example.com) to pass hostname verification in contexts where Name Constraints should prohibit it. the second allows a raw Unicode CN to bypass the cn2dnsid equivalence check while still being accepted by hostname verification, creating an inconsistency between what Name Constraints validates and what hostname verification accepts.

both vulnerabilities apply only where Name Constraints are relied on, the certificate has no dNSName SAN, and name verification uses the CN. using AWS-LC, Kubernetes or SPIFFE does not by itself show that a deployment is affected.

published advisories

advisory package vulnerable patched severity (AWS)
GHSA-3jrg-j22w-mpmc AWS-LC >= v1.61.0, < v1.71.0 v1.71.0 Medium
GHSA-394x-vwmw-crm3 aws-lc-sys (Rust) >= 0.32.0, < 0.39.0 0.39.0 Medium

no CVE IDs were assigned by AWS CNA. no CVSS scores were published.

workarounds (per AWS advisory): applications that set X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT to disable CN fallback are not affected. applications that only encounter certificates with dNSName SANs (standard for public WebPKI) are also not affected. otherwise, upgrade.

severity

HIGH — CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 7.4

Vector: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CWE: CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation)

AWS CNA published both advisories as Medium with no CVSS vector. the same bug class received CVE-2022-21656 (CVSS 7.5) from Google CNA for an equivalent Name Constraints bypass in Envoy.

severity dispute

AWS CNA determined that neither finding meets CVE scope, citing CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements and limited utilization. both findings received GHSA-only with Medium severity and no CVSS score.

1seal's assessment: CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements govern publicly-trusted CAs for web browsers. they do not apply to private CA deployments, which are the primary consumers of RFC 5280 Name Constraints. private PKI environments routinely issue CN-only certificates and rely on Name Constraints as a security boundary. the attack surface exists precisely in the environments Name Constraints are designed to protect.

this advisory uses 1seal's independent severity assessment. CERT/CC is assessing the cross-implementation scope independently.

affected versions

component vulnerable range fixed version
aws-lc (C) >= v1.61.0, < v1.71.0 v1.71.0
aws-lc-sys (Rust crate) >= 0.32.0, < 0.39.0 0.39.0
s2n-tls transitive via aws-lc update aws-lc dependency

aws-lc is used by s2n-tls, which is used by AWS SDKs and services for TLS operations. AWS states that customers of AWS services do not need to take action.

findings

finding 1: wildcard CN bypass (1SEAL-2026-002a)

root cause

when a certificate contains a commonName but no dNSName SAN, aws-lc hostname verification falls back to matching the CN against the requested hostname. the NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN function calls cn2dnsid to convert the CN to a DNS identifier for constraint checking. however, cn2dnsid does not handle wildcard CNs — it skips them, returning without performing Name Constraints validation.

the wildcard CN then reaches hostname verification, which does support wildcard matching. the result: a wildcard CN bypasses Name Constraints entirely while still matching hostnames.

attack scenario

an attacker who controls a constrained intermediate CA can issue a certificate with CN=*.example.com and no SAN. Name Constraints that should restrict this CA to a specific namespace (e.g., .internal.corp) are not applied. the certificate passes hostname verification for any hostname matching *.example.com, breaking the namespace boundary that Name Constraints are supposed to enforce.

finding 2: Unicode CN equivalence gap (1SEAL-2026-002b)

root cause

the cn2dnsid function in aws-lc converts commonName values to DNS identifiers for Name Constraints checking. it rejects CNs containing raw Unicode characters (non-ASCII bytes), returning without validation. however, the hostname verification path accepts these same raw Unicode CNs when comparing against the requested hostname.

this creates an inconsistency: cn2dnsid says "I can't validate this CN" and skips it, but hostname verification says "this CN matches" and accepts it. Name Constraints are never applied to the CN because cn2dnsid opted out, but the certificate is still used because hostname verification opted in.

attack scenario

an attacker who controls a constrained intermediate CA can issue a certificate with a CN containing Unicode characters that, after processing, match a target hostname. Name Constraints are not applied because cn2dnsid rejects the Unicode input. hostname verification accepts the certificate because it processes the CN through a different path.

exploitation requirements

both findings require:

  1. a private PKI environment using RFC 5280 Name Constraints for namespace segmentation
  2. a constrained intermediate CA (attacker-controlled or compromised)
  3. the constrained CA issues a certificate with a CN but no dNSName SAN
  4. the relying party uses aws-lc (directly or via s2n-tls) for certificate validation, and name verification falls back to the CN (X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT is not set)

these conditions describe the trigger. whether a deployment meets them depends on whether its certificates lack a dNSName SAN and whether its verification falls back to the CN. the use of aws-lc, Kubernetes or SPIFFE does not by itself show that.

fix

fixed in aws-lc v1.71.0 and aws-lc-sys v0.39.0, published March 19, 2026.

  • aws-lc users: upgrade to v1.71.0+
  • aws-lc-sys (Rust) users: upgrade to v0.39.0+
  • s2n-tls consumers: update the aws-lc transitive dependency. check lock files for version pins.

timeline

date event
2026-02-28 reported to AWS Security via aws-security@amazon.com
2026-03-10 CERT/CC coordination case submitted (VRF#26-03-LDFDW)
2026-03-10 AWS confirmed fix in progress, targeting March 19 release
2026-03-18 AWS CNA determined: GHSA for both findings, CVE not in scope
2026-03-19 aws-lc v1.71.0 and aws-lc-sys v0.39.0 released
2026-03-19 GHSA-3jrg-j22w-mpmc (aws-lc) and GHSA-394x-vwmw-crm3 (aws-lc-rs) published
2026-03-19 public disclosure

credit

discovered by Oleh Konko (1seal) as part of a systematic audit of TLS certificate validation infrastructure.

references

CVE: AWS CNA determined not in scope. both findings published as GHSA-only (Medium, no CVSS). CERT/CC coordination case active, assessing independently.

this advisory is published by 1seal. for questions: security@1seal.org

Paper copy does not update. Current version: 1seal.org/research/advisories/1SEAL-2026-002/